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ABSTRACT 
 
In the literature on optimal indemnity schedules, indemnities are usually restricted to be 
non-negative. Gollier (1987) shows that this constraint might well bind: insured could get 
higher expected utility if insurance contracts would allow payments from the insured to 
the insurer at some losses. However, due to the insurers’ cost function Gollier supposes, 
the optimal insurance contract he derives underestimates the relevance of the non-
negativity constraint on indemnities. This paper extends Gollier’s findings by allowing 
for negative indemnity payments for a broader class of insurers’ cost functions. 
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1. Introduction 
In insurance economics there is a vast literature on optimal indemnity schedules.1 
A common exercise in this literature is to restrict feasible indemnity schedules in 
several ways. First, premiums are supposed to recover at least expected indemnity 
payments. This restriction is sensible since it guarantees non-negative profits of 
insurers. It can be interpreted as the participation constraint of the insurer. Sec-
ond, indemnity payments must not exceed losses, or (with some loss of generality) 
marginal indemnities must be smaller than 1. While this restriction is most rele-
vant in practice, where insurers have to be concerned about moral hazard, it is not 
clear why it is also imposed in simpler models that abstract from moral hazard.2 
Third, and finally, indemnities have to be non-negative. This assumption looks 
most sensible, since it prevents risk averse insured to become insurers themselves. 
However, as Gollier (1987) points out, this restriction can be binding for some 
loss distributions. In other words, under certain circumstances, the insured can get 
higher expected utility if they are allowed to sign contracts that provide for pay-
ments from the insured to the (risk neutral!) insurer for some losses. 
Specifically, Gollier obtains the following results for insurance contracts that do 
not impose a non-negativity constraint on indemnities: 
1. As in insurance contracts of the usual deductible type (Arrow, 1971), op-
timal contracts show a (non-negative) loss  that acts as a deductible. For 
all losses above the deductible marginal indemnity is 1 and  indemnity 
amounts to for .  
+x
+−= xxxI )( +> xx
2. Optimal contracts might contain a (non-negative) loss  with . 
For all losses between zero and  indemnity is negative and marginal in-
demnity equals 1. Consequently, indemnity payments are given by 
 for . 
−x +− ≤ xx
−x
−−= xxxI )( −< xx
                                                 
1  See for example Mossin (1968); Gould (1969); Arrow (1971); Moffet (1977); Raviv (1979); Drèze (1981); 
Schlesinger (1981); Gollier and Schlesinger (1996); Spaeter and Roger (1997). Many more contributions 
deal with the consequences of asymmetric information on optimal indemnity schedules.  
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3. For all losses between  and  indemnities are zero −x +x
4. For the lower bound it is true that )21(Fx ≤− , with  representing 
the cumulative distribution function of losses 
)(xF
x . The practical conse-
quence of this result is that the non-negativity constraint is never binding 
if the probability of suffering a loss is less than 21 , which is obviously 
the case for many insured incidents. 
The aim of this paper is to show that Gollier’s results partly depend on the special 
form of a restriction he imposes on the insurer’s cost function and that the non-
negativity constraint is more likely to bind if we allow for more general cost func-
tions. Gollier assumes costs C depending on the expected value of absolute in-
demnities )(xI  transferred between insurer and insured ( )( )))(( xIEC . This cost 
structure reflects the assumption that the insurer has to bear fixed costs only (e.g. 
for hiring staff and renting offices before knowing the actual value of the indem-
nities). However, it is more plausible to assume that costs also depend on indem-
nities actually transferred. This calls for a more flexible cost function which will 
turn out to change some of Gollier’s results considerably.  
2. The model 
While Gollier gets his results by applying calculus of variation, this paper will (in 
line with Raviv (1979)) employ optimal control theory.  
2.1 Assumptions 
Let risk averse individuals have utility function U , )(A 0)( >′ AU , , 
with  representing their net wealth. The risk neutral insurer is supposed to re-
cover cost but to make zero expected profit. Premiums 
0)( <′′ AU
A
( )P  therefore are equal to 
indemnities paid plus administrative costs that also emerge when indemnities are 
negative: 
                                                                                                                                     
2  See Huberman, Mayers and Smith (1983), who derive an optimal indemnity schedule for a concave cost 
function containing a vanishing deductible and a marginal indemnity greater than 1. 
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 (1) ( )( )∫ +=
L
dxxfxICxIP
0
)()()( , 
with  representing the density function of losses. We impose a maximal loss 
of . In order to allow for increasing marginal costs 
)(xf
L ( ) 0)( ≥′ xIC  and 
( )( ≥x ) 0′′C I .  
In contrast, Gollier assumes costs to amount to ( )))(( xIEC . Consequently, in his 
model the premium reads as 
(2) 


+= ∫∫
LL
Gol dxxfxICdxxfxIP
00
)()()()( . 
Observe that (1) is compatible with Gollier’s premium function (2) if marginal 
costs are constant ( 0)=′′C . Therefore (1) is indeed a generalization of (2). 
Let  denote individuals’ exogenous wealth. Insured’s expected utility w
(3)  ( )∫ +−−
L
dxxfxIxPwU
0
)()(
is to maximize subject to (1). The constraint xxI ≤)(  is disregarded for two rea-
sons: First, as pointed out before, this constraint does not make much sense in a 
model which does not allow for informational asymmetries, specifically moral 
hazard. Second, it will turn out that this restriction is not binding anyway if costs 
are convex.    
2.2 The optimal indemnity schedule 
In order to solve this problem using optimal control, we introduce the following 
state variable:3 
(4) ( )( )∫ +−=Γ
x
dxxfxICxIx
ˆ
0
)()()()ˆ( . 
                                                 
3  For mathematical reference see Chiang (1992, chapter 10). 
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The initial condition is that . The terminal condition reads as 0)0( =Γ PL −=Γ )( , 
which corresponds to a zero-profit constraint for the insurer. The corresponding 
Hamiltonian reads as 
 (5) ( ) ( )( ) )()()()()()( xfxICxIxxfxIxPwUH +−+−−= λ . 
Since the Hamiltonian does not depend on the state variable 0)( =Γ∂
∂−=′ Hxλ , i.e. 
λ  is a constant. To find the optimal indemnity schedule, the Hamiltonian is dif-
ferentiated w.r.t. . After rearranging terms, one has: )(xI
(6) ( ) ( )( )))(()(1)( xIsignxICxIxPwU ⋅′+=+−−′ λ . 
For negative (positive) indemnities, this can be simplified to 
 (7) ( ) ( )( ))(1)( xICxIxPwU −′−=+−−′ λ   and 
(8) ( ) ( )( ))(1)( xICxIxPwU ′+=+−−′ λ ,  
respectively. Eliminating λ  and combining (7) and (8) yields 
(9) ( )( )( )
( )
( )( ) 0)(0)( )(1
)(
)(1
)(
>< ′+
+−−′=−′−
+−−′
xIxI xIC
xIxPwU
xIC
xIxPwU . 
As can be seen from (9), negative indemnities are restricted: The marginal costs 
they induce must be lower than 1. At 0)( =xI , (9) might be rewritten as 
(10) ( )( )( )
( )
( )( )0101 C
xPwU
C
xPwU
′+
−−′=′−
−−′ +− . 
According to (10) +− = xx  for ( ) 00 =′C . However, for positive marginal costs 
, the denominator on the rhs of (10) is greater than the denominator on 
the lhs. To compensate for this difference, 
( )( 00 >′C )
( )+−−′ xPw
) 1≥
U  must be greater than 
. Under the assumption of decreasing marginal utility, this can only 
be the case if  . As negative indemnities are restricted, no positive lower 
bound  can be determined if 
( −−′ PwU
−x
)−x
+x− <x
( 0( )−′ I
( ))0(I
C . Therefore, in this paper it is as-
sumed that marginal costs  are strictly smaller than 1. C −′
From (9) and (10) follows: 
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• The optimal indemnity schedule contains a lower bound  and an upper 
bound (i.e. a deductible) . For losses lower than  indemnities are 
negative (the insured pays the insurer); for losses exceeding  indemni-
ties are positive.  
−x
+x −x
+x
• For losses between  and  no transfer between insurer and insured 
takes place.  
−x +x
• The distance between  and  depends on marginal costs at  
and the insured’s risk aversion. The more risk averse insured, the smaller 
the range of losses they have to bear completely.   
−x +x 0)( =xI
For increasing marginal costs full marginal indemnity is not generally optimal. 
Instead, 1)( ≤∂
∂
x
xI . This can be shown by differentiating (6) w.r.t. x : 
(11) 
( )
( )  ∂
∂⋅′′
=


∂
∂+−⋅+−−′′
x
xIxIC
x
xIxIxPwU
)()(
)(1)(
λ
. 
Solving for 
x
xI
∂
∂ )(  and substituting for λ  from (6) gives the marginal indemnity 
(12) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))()()(1 )()(1)( xICAUAUxIsignxIC AUxIsignxICxxI ′′⋅′−′′⋅⋅′+
′′⋅⋅′+=∂
∂ , 
with . )(xIxPwA +−−=
 Finally, using the definition of absolute risk aversion ( ) ( )( )AU
AUARa ′
′′−=  results in: 
(13) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ))()(1 )(
)(
xIsignxIC
xIC
ARa
ARa
x
xI
⋅′+
′′+
=∂
∂ . 
Remember from (9) that . Therefore, ( ) 1)( ≤−′ xIC 1)( ≤0 ∂
∂≤
x
xI . Specifically: 
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• Marginal indemnity increases with insured’s risk aversion. As risk aver-
sion approaches infinity, full marginal reimbursement becomes optimal. 
• Constant marginal costs turn out to be special case of (13) with , 
giving rise to full marginal reimbursement. 
0=′′C
However, in general optimal indemnity schedules will call for less than full mar-
ginal indemnity. Instead, the optimal indemnity schedule will look somewhat like 
shown in figure 1: 
Figure 1: Optimal indemnity with increasing marginal costs 
 
x
I(x) 
x~x- x+
Figure 1 illustrates the results obtained so far. From (10) it is known that  and 
 coincide for infinitely risk adverse individuals. In figure 1 this point is labelled 
. It will be determined in more detail in the next section. However, for not infi-
nitely risk averse individuals the two limits  and  are on the left hand side 
and the right hand side of  
−x
+x
xˆ
−x +x
x~ , respectively. For losses −< xx  indemnity is paid 
from the insured to the insurer (indemnities are negative). For losses   in-
demnities are paid from the insurer to the insured (indemnities are positive). 
Losses between  and  are borne by the insured alone. Marginal indemnity is 
+x>x
−x +x
1)( ≤∂∂ xxI0 ≤  for all losses: For losses lower than  insured can partly reduce 
their payments to the insurer but not for the full amount of the loss; a marginal 
−x
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increase of the loss will only entitle insured to reduce their payments by less than 
the marginal increase of the loss.  For losses greater than  the insured are enti-
tled to receive positive indemnity payments from the insurer. However, marginal 
indemnity will again be lower than 1 so that insured still have to bear a marginal 
loss partly.  
+x
(( I
3. More detailed characterization of the optimal contract 
Having derived the main properties of an insurance contract without the non-
negativity constraint on indemnities, it is useful to further explore the terms of the 
optimal insurance contract. In particular, since +− ≤ xx
−x
 the upper bound for  
and the lower bound for   are of interest. Since  and  coincide for infi-
nitely risk adverse insured, both bounds have the same value labelled  in figure 
1.    
−x
+x +x
xˆ
To determine x~  remember that premiums depend on the actuarially fair value of 
expected (net-)indemnity payments plus administrative cost, which rise as trans-
fers between insurer and insured rise. The former do not change insured’s ex-
pected wealth. In contrast, insured’s losses due to administrative costs are lower if 
transactions between insurer and insured are reduced. While individuals’ risk 
aversion determines the distance between  and  as well as the slope of the 
indemnity function, the critical value 
−x +x
x~  depends on the administrative cost func-
tion alone. Expected transaction costs are minimized for any indemnity schedule 
by a loss x~  that minimizes 
(14)   ( )( ) dxxfxxICL )(~
0
∫ − . 
If no transfer between insurer and insured takes place, ) ) 00 =C . Differentiat-
ing (14) w.r.t. x~  yields the necessary condition 
(15) ( )( ) ( ) 0)()~(~~
0
=−⋅−′⋅−′−∫ dxxfxxsignxxIxxIC
L
, 
which is more readable if written as 
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(16) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0)(~'~)(~'~
~
~
0
=−⋅−′−−⋅−′ ∫∫ dxxfxxIxxICdxxfxxIxxIC
L
x
x
. 
If marginal costs are constant, marginal indemnity equals 1 (see equation (13)) 
and x~  always coincides with the median of the loss distribution.4 Consequently, 
in this case the non-negativity constraint is never binding if the probability of loss 
is lower than 21 .  
However, according to (16) in general x~  will deviate from the median. For 
asymmetric distributions with more mass on low losses, x~  will be on the right 
hand side of the median for the following reasons: 
• High losses can deviate more from x~  than low losses, causing higher ab-
solute indemnities than low losses do. 
• Higher indemnities go along with higher marginal costs. 
• From (9), marginal indemnities for low losses are restricted. 
All this will cause the weight of the second term in (16) to get higher than it 
would be under constant marginal indemnities and constant marginal costs. To 
balance out both terms, x~  has to move to the right of the median. Consequently, 
for convex costs it is not true in general that the non-negativity constraint is not 
binding if the probability of loss is lower than 21 . For sharply increasing mar-
ginal costs, x~  may deviate from the median considerably. An imposed non-
negativity constraint therefore will be binding more often than Gollier suggests. 
The effect of a non-negativity constraint to the insured is that they are urged to 
accept higher marginal costs to reduce the variance of their final wealth. This ef-
fect becomes most obvious for insured with risk aversion approaching infinity, 
inducing full marginal indemnity5. In order to stabilize their final income they can 
                                                 
4 If marginal indemnity is 1 and ,  the term xxx ~== +− ( )( )xxI ~−′C  simplifies to ( )xx ~−′C  This allows 
to rewrite (16) as ( ) ( ) ( ) 01)~(2~(~ ~ =−⋅−′=


⋅−′ ∫ xFxxCfxx
x
x
)()
~
−∫ dxxfdxx
L
x
C  , which is zero if x~ takes the value 
of the median or if marginal costs are zero.  
5  This result is due to (13). See also table 1. 
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only reduce their final losses to zero and have to bear the high marginal costs of 
the high indemnity payments from the insurer. 
Table 1 summarizes the range of optimal indemnity schedules for different de-
grees of risk aversion and different cost functions by highlighting some extreme 
cases for an asymmetric loss distribution with more mass on low losses. If mar-
ginal costs are zero (cases (a) and (b)) the insured will insure their full wealth or 
buy no insurance at all (if confronted with high fixed costs of the insurance con-
tract, e.g. provision for the agent). If marginal costs are positive but constant 
(cases (c) and (d)), the insured will always opt for full marginal indemnity. As 
risk aversion approaches infinity,  and   will tend towards the median of the 
loss distribution as in case (d).  Case (e) represents the standard indemnity sched-
ule for non-constant but finite marginal costs and finite risk aversion. Note that 
−x +x
x~  
is right off the median. Consequently, the optimal indemnity schedule for infi-
nitely risk averse individuals cuts the abscissa at x~  rather than at (case (f)).   medx
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Table 1: Optimal indemnity schedules without the non-negativity constraint  
               on indemnities 
 ∞<< )(1 ARa  ∞→)(ARa  
 
 
0=′C  
(a) (b) 
 
 
0>′C  
0=′′C  
(c) (d) 
 
 
0>′C  
0>′′C  
(e) (f) 
 
4. Conclusion 
The non-negativity constraint on indemnities is common in insurance economics. 
Gollier (1987) was the first to show that this constraint may be binding under a 
certain cost function. By deriving the properties of an optimal insurance contract 
xx~  +x
−x
xx~
x
medxxmedx  +x
−x
x
medxxmedx  
)(xI
 
)(xI
 
)(xI
 
)(xI
 
)(xI
 
)(xI
 
 
  
for a broader class of convex cost functions, this paper shows that relaxing the 
non-negativity constraint affects the optimal insurance contract in ways that have 
not been recognized before. It has been shown that optimal marginal indemnity 
will be smaller or equal 1. Negative indemnities might be restricted. Furthermore, 
the optimal contract might contain negative indemnity payments even if probabil-
ity of loss is less than 21 .  
These results prove that our analysis is more than an academic exercise. They 
make insurance contracts allowing for negative indemnities interesting for a 
broader class of insured incidents. For these incidents, individuals could get in-
surance coverage by accepting some loss around a critical value at any state of the 
world at considerably lower costs than a contract would cause that does not allow 
for negative indemnities.  
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